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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
E. J. MAYHEW,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

1
Case No.
9652

vs.
STANDARD GILSONI'TE COMpANY, A Corporation,
Defendant;.. A ppella;nt.
BEAVER DAM SALES COMpANY, A Partnership,
Plat'ntiff-Respondent,
vs.
ST·ANDARD GILSONITE COMPANY, A Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

I
Case No.
96:53

RESP'O'NDENT'S BRIEF
STATE11ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by both plaintiffs against
the same defendant seeking a declaratory judgment to
the effect that contracts entered into between the parties
concerning certain patent rights were terminated, or in
the alternative ,,~ere and are null and void, and for other
relief.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On February 23, 1962, the T'rial Court entered a default judgment against defendant in each case granting
relief to each plaintiff as prayed. A subsequent motion
to set aside the default judgment in each case was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
On appeal the defendant-appellant seeks a reversal
of the order of the Trial Court in each case denying its
motion to set aside the default judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant corporation entered into a contract with
each of the plaintiffs here involved. The first contract
with Beaver Dam Sales Company was in September of
1956. (Case No. 9653, R, Pgs. 5-9) The second contract
with E. J. Mayhew was in July of 1958. (Case No. 9652,
R, Pgs. 5-8)
During the life of both agreements the defendant was
repeatedly in default under them. (Case No. 9652, R, Pgs.
14, 15; Case No. 9653, R, Pgs. 19, 20) Except for a "brief
period" in the latter part of 1960, defendant did not have
a regular board of directors for two years prior to the
entry of the judgment appealed fron1. (Case No. 9653, R,
Pg. 28, lines 12-15) On March 31, 1961, the State of Utah
suspended the charter of defendant. (Ex. 1, both cases)
At that time R. J. Pinder was president of defendant.
The corporation is now insolvent. (Defendant-Appellant's
Briefs, Case No. 9652, Pg. 19; Case No. 9653, Pg. 20)
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Both plaintiffs had served notice,s on defendant terminating their agreements. (Ex. 3, both cases)
On December 21, 1961, Beaver Dam Sales Company
filed its complaint in Case No. 9653 with the Salt Lake
County Clerk. Service was attempted to be made upon
R. J. Pinder, president and only known officer of defendant company. Service was not made as Mr. Pinder could
not be found. Mr. Pinder attempted to resign as president
of defendant on January 18, 1962. (Case No. 9653, R,
Pgs. 23, 24) On January 30, 1962 an amended complaint
was filed by Beaver Dam Sales Company and an original
complaint was filed by E. J. Mayhew commencing Case
No. 9652. On February 1, 1962, R. J. Pinder, as president
of defendant, was served with summons. On February
16, 1962, R. J. Pinder retained counsel to represent defendant. (Defendant's briefs, page 4) On February 23,1962,
the defendant's default was entered and judgment taken
against it in both cases. On the same day defendant filed
a motion in each case to set aside the. default and the
judgment so entered. No documents other than the motion and notice of motion in each case were filed at that
ti1ne. (R, Case No. 9652, Pg. 25, et seq.; R, Case No. 9653,
Pg. 58, et seq.)
The motions were set for hearing on March 7, 1962.
At the appointed time counsel for plaintiffs and defen.
dant were present. Discussion was held off the reeord.
and the Court pointed out to counsel for defendant that
there were no documents on file on which the Court could
base a ruling in the defendant's favor. ·The Court then
said (R, Case No. 9652, Pg. 16; Case No. 9653, Pg. 21):
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"I think in fairness to Mr. Bradford [counsel
for defendant] I am going to give him ten days
to support this motion and we can hear it further,
but I don't think you have got anything before
the Court at this time to base this upon ... [after
arguments of counsel] I will give you until next
Wednesday to file with him [plaintiffs' counsel]
and with the Court motions, whatever you desire
further, that should support this, and we will hear
the matter at 2:30 on the 14th... "
On March 14, 196·2, defendant's counsel filed an affidavit in each case and served them on plaintiffs' counsel.
The Trial Court heard testimony and considered the
record, including the contents of the affidavits, and on
March 15, 1962 denied the motions in both cases. (Case
No. 9652, R, P~ 28; Case No. 9·653, R, Pg. 61) It is the
denial of these ~"'from which defendant appeals.
Plaintiffs object to defendant's "Statement of Facts"
as set forth in its two briefs on file herein on grounds that
the Statements are argumentative, that they set forth as
facts material which is not in the record, or is contradicted by the record or is taken out of context and made
misleading thereby. This honorable Court is urged to
make a careful study of the record before relying on any
such statements.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE T'RIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'-RBSFON- t;4PPct..t-AN1·
:QEN~'& MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT.
THE RECORD DISCLOSES THAT ANY OTHER
HOLDING WOULD CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE
ERROR.

Competing philosophies of law are always presented
when a Court is asked to set aside a default judgment.
On the one hand it is said that defaults are not favored in
the law because they prevent the defaulted party from
having his day in court. On the other hand, defaults
serve a socially desirable purpose because they permit
the business of the community to progress to necessary:
conclusions.
An examination of the records in these cases will reveal to this Court that the action of the Trial Court below
in sustaining the defaults was not as harsh as might be
supposed and jn fact was well deserved. The defendant
corporation has been guilty of financial and business irresponsibility for some time (see Statement of Facts,
supra) which has not endeared it to thos.e who have had
contractual and business relations with it.
On March 31, 1961, the charter of the defendant corporation was suspended by the State of Utah (Exhibit 1,
both cases) and at the date of this writing that charter
has not been reinstated or reactivated. The suspension of
the charter occurred for failure to pay the annual license
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taxes required by the state under the provisions of Sec.
59-13-61, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. (Exhibit 1, both
cases) As a result of that action, the defendant was
prohibited by law from functioning or doing any business
whatsoever (Sec. 59-13-61, supra), and further, any individual who attempted to conduct business in the name of
the corporation was subject to indictment for doing so.
(Sec. 59-13-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, makes any
such attempt an indictable misdemeanor.)
In addition to the foregoing, the corporation was
without management, had only two directors (Mr. R. J.
Pinder and one other), was insolvent and is now in bankruptcy proceedings, and was and is for all practical purposes defunct. (See defendant's briefs: Case No. 9652,
Pgs. 3, 10, 19; Case No. 9653, Pgs. 4, 11, 20.) The defendant consistently failed to perform under its contracts
with plaintiffs. (See Case No. 9653, R, Pgs. 19, 20; Case
No. 9652, R, Pgs. 14, 15.)
Defendant has attempted to delay and stall these
plaintiffs at every turn, including before this honorable
Court. This last was accomplished by not filing the record
herein until the last possible mo1nent after receiving an
extension from the Trial Court. Tlris, despite the relative
brevity of the· record.
As to the law of the case, a general statement of it is
aptly set out in 3 Baron & Holtzo.ff, Fed. Practice and
Procedwre, page 89, Sec. 1~17, Setting Aside Default:
"A motion to set aside a default or a judgInent h~T default is addressed to the diseretion of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the court, and an adequate basiJs for the motion
must be shown. In exercising this discretion the
court will be guided by the fact that default judgments are not favored in the law. Courts exist to
do justice, and are properly reluctant to lend
their processes to the enforcement of an unjust
judgment. At the same time, the rules which require responsive pleadings within a limited time
serve important social goals, and a party should
not be allowed to flaunt them with impunity. In
balancing these policies, the court should not reopen a default judgment merely because the party
in default requests it, but should require the party
to show that there was good reason for the default
and that he has a meritor.ious defense to the action. However, the fact that defendant has a me,ritorious defense does not justify setting the
judgment aside if no good excuse for the default
is shown. The merits of the controversy will not
be considered unless an adequate reason for the
default is shown." [Emphasis supplied]
As an example of the emphasized portion of the foregoing the·re is cited the case of U. S. vs. Edgewater Dyeing and Finishing Company, DC Pa. 1957, 21 F.R.D. 304
in which it was held that where there was no allegation
that the amount of the plaintiff's claim was not justly
due contained in a motion to set aside the default, or elsewhere, the motion was properly denied.
The doctrine enunciated above has been followed by
this court from its earliest days down through the adoption of the new Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, patterned
after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; this has been
so from the case of Utah Commercial & Savings Bank vs.
Tntmbow (1898) 17 Utah 198, 53 P. 1033 down to the case
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of Ney vs. Harrvson (1956) 5 Utah 2d 217,299 P. 2d 1114.
In Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co. (1953) 123 Utah 416, 260
P. 2d 741, decided under the new rules, Justice McDonough, at page 419 of 123 Utah substantially paraphrases
the above quoted language of Baron & Holtzoff to the
same effect.
Thus it may be seen that any defendant who seeks to
set aside a default judgment must fulfill two requirements. First, he must show that on some statutory ground.
he is entitled to set aside the default. He must make a
showing that there has been the required neglect, mistake
or other ground through the form of an affidavit attached
to and filed in support of the motion. He must further
show that he has a meritorious defense which, if the default vs set aside, will entitle him to be heard, and if true,
will entitle him to judgment on the merits.
It is not sufficient simply to state the conclusion that
the movant has a meritorious defense; he must set forth
that defense in detail and in such form that the other
party would not be entitled to a motion to dismiss. 60
C.J.S. 25, Motions and Orders, Sec. 23; Salt Lake City vs.
Utah and S.alt Lake Canal Company (1913) 43 Utah 591,

137 P. 638; vVarren VS. Di:ron R((J:Cll Co., supra. Here the
defendant merely recited that it had been guilty of neglect
and that it had a meritorious defense. But there is nothing in the record to indicate what facts constituted neglect
nor what facts and c.ircumsta;nces constituted a defense.
The ultimate conclusion of the movant is obviously insufficient.
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In this particular case the defendant did neither.
There were no affidavits filed in either case with the motion to set aside the default judgment which demonstrated
excusable neglect or mistake or any other ground for setting aside a default. In addition, no proposed answer was
filed in the matter and of course there being no proposed
answer, there was no showing of .any defense, meritorious
or otherwise. In other words, at the time of the first
hearing on the motion, March 7, 19'62, there was absolute;.
ly nothing on which the Trial Court could base an order
to set aside the default and the default judgment and the
Court told defendant so. (Case No. 9652, R, Pg. 16; Case
No. 9653, R, Pg. 21) The Court granted the defendant a
week in which to file the necessary affidavits, proposed
answers, or other documents that the defendant may wish
to file in support of its motions to set aside the defaults.
The hearing on the motion was set over to 2 :30 P. M.,
March 14, 1962.
On March 14, 1962, the defendant served on plaintiff
an affidavit in each case executed by one~ R. J. Pinder.
However, it is plaintiffs' opinion, and obviously the opin-j
ion of the Trial Court, that the affidavits did not contain
the necessary requisites to show excuable neglect or mistake and did not show a meritorious defense. In our opinion it discussed many extraneous matters not pertinent
to the case at issue. Apparently the defendant felt the
san1e way as it did not designate these affidavits for inclusion in the records.
But it should he noted the Trial Court did have the
benefit of the affidavits as well as all of the rest of the
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record now before this Court and in addition, had the
benefit of the arguments of defendant's counsel. With all
of this before it the ·Trial Court still denied the motions
to set aside the defaults.
In Warren vs. Dt"xon Ranch Co. (1953) 123 Utah 416,
260 P. 2d 741, 1fr. Justice McDonough, speaking for a
unanimous court, stated at page 422 of 123 Utah as
follows:
"Appellants' conduct is not entirely inexcusable and the trial court could have, in its discretion, set aside the judgment; but, on the other
hand, respondent and the trial court were justified
in believing that appellants had abandoned their
defense. The rule that the courts will incline toward granting relief to a party who has not had
opportunity to present his case is ordinarily applied at the trial court level, and this court will
not reverse the trial court where it appears (as
here from the memorandum decision which is a
part of the record) that all elements were considered, me,rely because the motion could have
been granted. Thi:s court 1cill not substitute its
discretvon for that of the trial court ,in a case su-ch
as this." [Emphasis supplied]
In the case of Ney vs. Harn;son (1956) 5 Utah 2d 217,
299 P. 2d 1114 the trial court had granted a motion to
set aside a default judgn1ent and one of the issues on
appeal was whether it should have done so. This Court
reaffirmed the, language of Warren vs. Dixon RaJZch Co.,
supra, and Mr. Justice Crockett, speaking for a unanimous court stated at page 220 of 5 Utah 2d as follows:
" ... The Utah decisions relied upon by plaintiff recognize the finnly established principle that
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it is largely within the discretion of the trial court
whether a default should be relieved, which discretion will not be· disturbed unless there is a
patent abuse thereof." [Emphasis supplied]
In the two cases before the Court there is absolutely
nothing in the record to show any abuse of discretion
whatsoe,ver. In point' of fact there is nothing in the
record which lends even a color of right to the request
made by defendants to set aside the judgments. The trial
court recognized this and gave defendant's counsel additional time in which to correct these defects. This it
did not do. It has no right now to complain of abuse of
discretion at the Trial Court level. There is nothing in
the record on which the 'Trial Court could base a ruling
in defendant's favor. The judgment must be affirmed.
POINT II.
THE COURT HAD AND HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE DE'FENDANT CORPORATION.

The record in both cases, when examined carefully,
shows that there, is no defect in the· service of summons.
It shows that the president of Standard Gilsonite, R. J.
Pinder, purportedly resigned only two weeks prior to
service upon him in these cases. His resignation came
after the Beaver Dam Sales Company· suit had been filed
against the company. Service had been attempted prior
to January 18th by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County without success. I-Iowever, Mr. Pinder knew that service was
being attempted upon him. At the time of his purported
resignation there was only one other director, if we are to
believe defendant's briefs (Case X o. 9652, Pg. 21; Case
~ o. 9653, Pg. 22) or at the most, two other directors.
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(Case No. 9653, R, Pg. 27) "There were no officers or
directors legally qualified in the State of Utah.'' (Defendant's Briefs, Pg. 10) There was no one legally authorized
to accept the resignation of Mr. Pinder. The Board of
Directors was not properly constituted and was not properly meeting. (Case No. 9653, R, Pg. 28, lines 11 to 15)
Mr. Pinder seems to have recognized this because he also
submitted his resignation to a "principal creditor and
stockholder". (Case No. 9653, R, Pg. 23, line 22 and Pg.
24, line 1)
Notwithstanding Pinder's purported resignation,
after he was served on February 1st, he advised a "group
of interested stockholders" of the fact of service who, in
turn, contacted the law firm of Jensen, Jensen & Bradford on February 16, 1962 "in order to determine what
could be done to protect the corporation.'' (Defendant's
Briefs, both cases, Pgs. 3, 4) These attorneys attempted
to get in touch with Mr. Pinder, it is said, in order to
"obtain the necessary information with which to protect
the corporation against the complaint herein involved."
(Defendant's Briefs, Pg. 4) Apparently contacting Mr.
Pinder was simpler for his attorneys than it was for his
creditors because they found him on the very same day.
(Defendant's Briefs, Pg. 4) He and his attorney contacted by long distance telephone certain other shareholders (while the word "other" does not appear in the
briefs, we can only assume such was the case since the
attorneys were initially contacted by one group of shareholders) and obtained authority to represent the defendant corporation. In other words, ~Ir. Pinder continued
to be active in the organization and attempted to obtain
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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representation for the purp·ose of defending hims,elf and
the corporation. He was successful in doing so on the
16th day of February, 1962, a full week before the default
judgment was taken.
A rather good summary of the law in this area is
found at 19 CJS 999, Corporations, Sec. 1316 as follows:
''Resignation of Officer. Service on an officer
who has eff.ected a valid resignation is inoperative, although plaintiff does not believe in the bona
fides of the resignation; hut where the resignation
of a corporate officer has never been acted on and
he continues to discharge his duties as officer, the
corporation cannot, after he has been served by
parties having no knowledge that his resignation
has been tendered, assert that he resigned prior
to the service. In the: ,absence of an acceptance of
the resignat~on, the incumbent contt~es as am
officer .de facto on whom service may be made;
but if notice of the resignation is given, and there
are other officers on whom service· may he made,
the acceptance of the resignation becomes immaterial. A fraudulent resignation to preiVent service
of process will not invalidate a service on the
officer who has attempted to resign. In case the
by-laws or articles of incorporation prov~de that
an officer shall hold until his successor ~s elected,
servioe may be had on an officer who has resvgned
until the corporatiJon elects his successor; hut
there is some authority to the contrary." [Emphasis supplied]
It is stipulated by the defendant at page 21 of both
its briefs that the corporate charter and by-laws of defendant provide that an officer shall hold office until a
successor is appointed. Consequently, under the rule of
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law enunciated above, Mr. Pinder continued as an officer
of the corporation until after February 1, 1962, and if the
situation has not changed, he is still an officer. Oases so
holding are Ross vs. Western Land & Irrig,ation Co., 223
F. 680; Venner vs. Denver Union Water Company, 40
Colo. 212, 90 P. 623, 122 Am. St. R. 1036; Colorado Debenture Corporation vs. Lombar,d Investment Company, 66
Kansas 251, 71 P. 584, 97 Am. St. R., 373; Freidenberg
vs. Lee Construction Co1npany, 27 Misc. 651, 58 NYS 391;
Timolat vs. S. J. Held Company, 17 Misc. 556, 40 NYS
692; Parker vs. Bethel Hotel Company, 96 Tenn. 252, 34
SW 209; 31 LRA 706; the only case to the contrary which
we have been able to find is Western Pattern and lJf_ anufacturing Co. vs. American Metal Shoe Company, 175
Wis. 493, 185 NW 535, 20 ALR 264. This case seems to be
clearly contrary to the weight of authority. (See annotation following the report of the case at 20 ALR 267, page
269).
See also the language contained in Warren vs. Dixon
Ranch Co., s~tpra at 123 Utah, page 421 which indicates
that the authority of the officers of a corporation to receive service of process continues after that corporation
has been suspended. The charter of the Di..xon Ranch Co.
was suspended in exactly the same n1anner and for exactly the same reason as was the charter of Standard Gilsonite Company, defendant herein.
If the la-w Vi erc not as outlined above, it would be
relatively si1nple for a Utah eorporation with finaneial
problen1s to avoid a legal deter1nination of its rights and
duties. It would simply fail to pay its state franehise tax
7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
and when its charter was suspended, all of its officers
would resign. Thus service of process would be impossible. The law never contemplated such a situation and
has avoided it as indicated.
Based upon the stipulations and admissions of counsel and the law as above set forth, there is no question
but that Mr. Pinder was the authorized agent to receive
service of process for the company as a matter of law and'
that the service upon him as president of the company
was perfectly proper. It follows that the court clearly
had jurisdiction over the defendant at the time the default judgments were entered.
But jurisdiction over the defendant rests on more
than mere personal service. After the entry of the defaults and judgments, defendant filed motions in each of
the two cases which were similiar except for the captions.
These motions moved the Court to set aside the default
and the judgment and decree entered in each of the cases :
(Case No. 9653, R, Pg. 58) " ... pursuant to Rule.
56( c) and Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. for the reason tha;t
because of mistake, inadvertance and excusable
neglect, defendant failed to file a timely answer
in said cause, and for the further reason that said
defendant has meritorious defenses and setoffs
in said cause·, and that defendant has not been
properly served with summons as required by
law."
(Case No. 9652, R, Pg. 25) " ... pursuant to Rule
56( c) and Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. for the reason that
because of mistake, inadvertence and excusable
neglect, defendant failed to file a timely answer
to the complaint and amended complaint in said
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cause and the further reasons that said defendant
was not properly se,rved with summons in said
cause and that said defendant has valid and meritorious defenses and setoffs in said cause.''
The law is clear that a motion phrased in such
language constitutes a general appearance subjecting the
movant to the jurisdiction of the court. Clawson vs.
Boston Acme Mt'nes Development Company (1928) 72
Utah 137, 269 P. 147, 59 ALR 1318; 6 CJS 32, Appearances, Sec. 12 (g) (2); 31 ALR 2d 262 at page 268. The
only time a movant challenges the jurisdiction of the
court is when he limits his motion strictly to that issue.
If he joins the jurisdictional ground with a non-jurisdictional ground in a motion to set aside a default, he is then
held to have made a general appearance. Clawson vs.
Boston Acme Mtnes Development Company, supra; 6
CJS 32, Appearances, Sec. 12 (g) (2); 31 ALR 2d 262 at
page 269.
We call the Court's attention to the annotation in
31 ALR 2d 262 at page 280 where under Sections. 11 and
12 it is stated that language such as that contained in defendant's motions are construed as general appearances.
Section 11 states:
"An allegation, in a motion for the vacation
of a judg1nent or order, to the effect that the
1novant has a good, n1eritorious, or substantial
defense against the action, is usually held to constitute a general appearance."
Section 12 states:
''l\f.otions to vacate a judgment or order on
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prise or excusable neglect, have generally been
held to operate as a general appearance."
Consequently, it may be seen that regardless of the
quality of the service, the court has jurisdiction of this
defendant and that the judgment will not fall on that
ground.
POINT III.
THE DEFAUIJT JUDGMENT AS ENTERED BY
THE 'TRIAL COURT IS PERFECTLY CONSISTENT
WITH THE LAW PERTAINING'TO ILLEGALITY OF
CONTRACTS AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.

The tenor of defendant's brief in Point III clearly
indicates that his counsel does not comprehend the basis
of the relief granted by the decision of the Trial Court.
A brief review of the situation will apprise the Court of
what transpired and help the Court and defendant to
understand the judgment as entered.
The subject matter of the contracts in both cases are
patents, or patent applications, which, at the time of the
execution of the contracts, were to be issued to E. J.
Mayhew. The patents in each instance were so-called
"Process Patents"; i.e., they covered the use of a certain
quality and size of gilsonite particles in a process to he
utilized by oil drillers.
Gilsonite of the size and specification called for by
the patented process is not, in and of itself, patentable.
Consequently, any producer of gilsonite of the kind and
size called for under the patent could legitimately and
properly sell his gilsonite to a person who was licensed
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by the holder of the process patent to utilize the process.
Under the contract between Standard Gilsonite Company
and Beaver Dam Sales Company involved in Case No.
9653, the Oourt will observe that an exclusive license was
given hy Beaver Dam Sales Company, the owner of the
process patent concerned in that case, to Standard Gilsonite Company. Collaterally with that exclusive license
was given the right to sub-license. (Case No. 9653, Exhibit 2) The contract further went on to provide that
Standard Gilsonite Company would bag its gilsonite of a
certain grade and kind and would sell it. Whoever would
buy the gilsonite would automatically receive a license to
use the process patent. (See page 3, Exhibit 2) The contract then called for the defendant to pay a royalty to
Beaver Dam equal to 3¥2% of the sales price received
from the sale of gilsonite. Incidentally, in refutation of
the defendant's claim that plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney
drew the contract, an examination of Exhibit 2 will reveal
that the agreement was dra'vn on the stationery of Irving
fl. Biele, attorney, and that Mr. Biele was the secretary
of Standard Gilsonite Company at that time.
An examination of the contract in the other case between Mayhew and the defendant indicates that instead of
granting defendant an exclusive license, Mayhew actually
assigned the patent to the defendant with a provision that
the patent would be reassigned in the event of a default.
Such reassignment was to be executed by defendant and
placed in escrovv with an escrow agent. It was then contemplated by the agremnent that defendant would sell
gilsonite for use in the patented process and would grant
a license to the user thereof upon the purchase of the
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gilsoni te. (Case No. 9652, R, page 14, lines 20 to 29)
Again, the agreement contemplated that Standard would
sell gilsonite and grant a license to the user and the only
way that Mayhew would receive any royalty was from
the sale of such gilsonite. The Court will notice in examining Exhibit 2 in Case No. 9652 (Mayhew-Standard
case) that the contract was also drawn on the stationery
of J\1r .. Biele who was still acting as attorney for Standard Gilsonite Company.
It will he seen from the foregoing that both contracts
contemplated that the defendant, Standard Gilsonite
Cmnpany, would sell gilsonite to the ultimate user and at
the same time, being the owner or exclusive licensee, of
the patent, would license the user to utilize the patent
with the particular gilsonite sold to it. Thus the granting
of a license to use the patents was tied to the sale of
gilsonite, an unpatented and unpatentable product. It is
this application of the patent to the· sale of gilsonite
which is illegal and which the court found violated the
provisions of Title 15, United States Code, and particularly Section 14 thereof. (See Leitch Manufacturing
Compa.ny vs. Ba.rber Comparny, 302 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct.
288, 82 L. Ed. 371; B. B. Chemical Company v.s. Ellis, 314
U.S. 495, 62 S. Ct. 406, 86 L. Ed. 367; Morton Salt Company vs. G. S. Suppvger Company, 314 U. S. 488, 62 S. Ct.
402, 86 L. Ed. 363.)
The essential illegality of the contract arose out of
the dealings between Standard Gilsonite Company and
third parties, in that Standard Gilsonite Company was
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patentable product to the licensing of a patent. Needless
to say, the significance of the fact that the transactions
took place in interstate commerce, which seemed to baffle
defendant's counsel (Defendant's brief, Case Nu. 9652,
pg. 26), is that unless the sales were in interstate commerce the federal anti-trust law would not be applicable.
All of the foregoing merely illustrates that neither
the assignment of the patent to defendant nor the granting of an exclusive license under the patent to defendant
was, in and of itself, illegal. Consequently, the plaintiffs
and defendant were not in pari delicto. The illegality
arose out of the fact that the plaintiffs could not receive
any consideration from the exploitation of their patent
unless the defendant entered into illegal arrangements
with third parties. The suits brought were partly predicated upon the concept that such an arrangement was
illegal, void and unenforceable as it pertained to defendant and consequently should be terminated and the
patents which were the subject of the contracts should be
returned to their rightful owners free of encumbrances.
There is ample authority for this relief in the law.
At 17 CJS, 656; Contracts, Sec. :27:2. et seq there is a
discussion of the enforceability of illegal contracts. The
broad general authorities cited in Part III of defendant's
briefs is supported in its generality by the early passages
of that ·work. IIowever, it is puinted out that there are
1nyriads of exceptions to the general precepts stated in
appellant's briefs. At 17 C.J.S. 666, See. :27S(b) is the
following:
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''The complaining party is especially protected by the law where the agreement is not
illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the
prohibition was intended for his protection, and in
such case, not being in pari delicto, he is entitled
to relief, but only the party whom the law was
designed to protect can take advantage of it. The
fact that the penalty is ~mpose:d on one of the
partves .alone shows cle.arly that the law does not
consider them in pari .delvcto, unless the prohibited
act would be illegal irre·spective of the statute ... "
[Emphasis supplied]
It is apparent from the law that any party desiring
to avail hilnself of his rights under the anti-trust laws
would proceed against defendant Standard Gilsonite
Company. It is the use of the patents to sell gilsonite
which is frowned upon. The injury flows to the user or
the competitor. No liability would attach to eithe·r of the
plaintiffs in this case, who are merely entitled to royalties
based upon the use of their patent. Consequently, it can
be seen that the penalty is imposed only upon the defen-.
dant in this case and not upon either of the plaintiffs. It
follows that the law would not consider the two parties in
pari delicto.
Si1nilarly it will he noted that the relief entered in
both cases merely clears the plaintiffs' titles and does not
require anything more than that the defendant relinquish
any residual rights it might have had under the contracts
with respect to the patents and cease utilizing the patents
to further its sales of gilsonite in any way. It does not
prevent defendant from selling its gilsonite, which, when
i.t was operating, was ostensibly its principal business.
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Even if the contract itself were tainted, the relief
granted is clearly proper. Again we refer to the section
on Contracts in 17 CJS 664 (Sec. 276).
"Under these principles, it has been held that
... the rule that no particeps criminis can maintain
an action founded on an illegal or immoral contract does not prohibit the vendor of land, where
the sale is illegal and the conveyance void, from
recovering the land, as he recovers it by vtnue of
his prior untainted legal title, .agaimst whrich defend.ant cannot set up a tvtle void by law."
See also Wooden vs. Shotwell, 23 N.J. Law 465,
affirmed 24 N.J. Law 789.
It may thus be seen that the Trial Oourt had ample
authority in law and equity to enter the judgment which
it did. In its sound discretion, the Court properly did not
feel justified in setting aside that judgment when there
was nothing before the Court to justify such an action.
The argument that plaintiffs are retaining the spoils
of an illegal contract is equally without merit. Defendant
only paid for what it -received as it received it. To the
extent any monie·s had been paid by defendant under the
contracts, it had value received therefor. Apart from the
illegality question, defendant had been in default under
the contracts. The contracts were sought by defendant
and drawn by its counsel to its specifications. It has
failed to promote or exploit the patents, either legally
or illegally.
The relief granted hy the Trial Court was proper,
legal and equitable and should stand as granted.
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CONCLUSION
As can be seen from the records and defendant's
briefs in these cases, Standard Gilsonite Company has all
but passed from the economic scene. Counsel for the company assert that "a group of interested stockholders" are
trying to rehabilitate· it, but plaintiffs have been so advised for years.
This defendant has not arrived at its present state of
despair over night. To one familiar with the management
of business affairs, it is quite apparent that a business of
the size of defendant arrived at the point of insolvency
only after a period of long mismanagement. We know
that some two and a half years ago it lost its legally constituted board of directors, under which it must legally
operate. We know, also, that somewhere along the line it
lost its capital, or it would not be insolvent today; and
that its corporate charter has been suspended for well
over a year.
This corporate ecdysiast has not shorn itself of all
means of conducting its business without injury to its
creditors, busine·ss associates and others. Plaintiffs have
fe1t the cold shoulder of fickle promises and have been
stood up at the financial altar on more than one occasion.
They have been tantalized into parting with cherished
possessions by promises of blissful economic union. And
they have had their glorious dreams shattered when the
promising defendant proved to be economically impotent.
Now plaintiffs, stung by the cold air of economic
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happy affair, sans alimony. But the defendant, using
every wile known to it, seeks to prolong the union as
though it were its last.
The Trial Court granted plaintiffs their freedom.
Upon supplication by the defendant, affecting an air of
injured innocence, the Court twice re-examined the question, all the while exhorting defendant to supply it with
reasons why the parties should remain together. None
were forthcoming, because, indeed, there are none.
There is no reason, legal, equitable or moral, why
this defendant, while in the throes of death, should be
allowed to emasculate plaintiffs in the prime of their
economic life. Further delay to plaintiffs could well result in that very emasculation.
The orders and judgments should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Moyle & Moyle
by Hardin A. Whitney, Jr.
810 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for

Pla~"ntiffs-Respon.dents
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